Tracie Woidtke, an associate professor in the Department of Finance, recently published a paper examining the ability of shareholders to get corporate boards of directors to act on their behalf. In particular, she looks at the effectiveness of “just vote no” campaigns in which a group of shareholders publicly withholds its votes from certain board members. Such actions generally have no direct impact because directors run unopposed and only need a plurality to win, so “just vote no” campaigns cannot possibly keep a director from being elected. Nevertheless, Woidtke’s empirical analysis shows that these campaigns spur significant changes, such as a threefold increase in the rate of forced CEO turnovers within a year and a significant increase in firm performance. The paper was published in the Journal of Financial Economics, one of the top two academic journals in finance, and it further cements Woidtke’s position as one of the leading experts in the shareholder/board relations.
Del Guercio, Diane, Laura Seery, and Tracie Woidtke, “Do Boards Pay Attention When Institutional Investor Activists ‘Just Vote No’?” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 90 no. 1 (2008): 84-103.
Kelley, Eric and Tracie Woidtke, “Investor Protection and Real Investment by U.S. Multinationals,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 41 no. 3 (2006): 541-572.
Yeh, Yin-Hua and Tracie Woidtke, “Commitment or Entrenchment? Controlling Shareholders and Board Composition,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 29 no. 7 (2005): 1857-1885.
Krishnamurthy, Srini, Paul Spindt, Venkat Subramaniam, and Tracie Woidtke, “Does Investor Identity Matter in Equity Issues? Evidence from Private Placements,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 14 no. 2 (2005): 210-238.
Woidtke, Tracie, “Agents Watching Agents? Evidence from Pension Fund Ownership and Firm Value,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 63 no. 1 (2002): 99-131.