Scott M. Gilpatric, an assistant professor in the Department of Economics, recently published a paper in the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization that examines how organizations can best manage workers who have a self-control problem in the form of sincerely agreeing to perform tasks but later not following through. His theoretical analysis suggests that it may be in the best interest of organizations to allow these workers some flexibility to slack off in order to prevent them from complete shirking. Gilpatric’s main research focus is on the internal organization of firms, and incentives facing workers and managers. His work has provided interesting behavioral insights on important topics such as cheating in contests, participation in mail-in rebate programs, and student performance in charter schools.
Gilpatric, Scott M. (2008). “Present-Biased Preferences, Self-Awareness, and Shirking.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 67(3), 735-754.
Booker, Kevin, Scott M. Gilpatric, Timothy Gronberg, and Dennis Jansen (2008). “The Effect of Charter Schools on Traditional Public School Students in Texas: Are Children Who Stay behind Left behind?” Journal of Urban Economics, 64(1), 123-145.
Gilpatric, Scott M. (2009). “Slippage in Rebate Programs and Present-Biased Preferences.” Marketing Science, 28(2), 229-239.
Gilpatric, Scott M. (2009). “Risk Taking in Contests and the Role of Carrots and Sticks.” Economic Inquiry, 47(2), 266-277.
Evans, Mary F., Scott M. Gilpatric, and Lirong Liu (forthcoming). “Regulation with Direct Benefits of Information Disclosure and Imperfect Monitoring.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.
Gilpatric, Scott M. (forthcoming). “Cheating in Contests.” Economic Inquiry.