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E.J. Coffman

September 3, 2010

E.J. Coffman

E.J. Coffman

E.J. Coffman, an assistant professor of philosophy, joined the Philosophy Department in 2007, a year after completing his Ph.D. at Notre Dame. He works primarily in epistemology, though he maintains also secondary research agendas concerned with the metaphysics of free will and with issues in the philosophy of religion. He published regularly in good journals his first few years, including a series of notable articles in Synthese, but he has hit a remarkable stride over the last 18 months, having had accepted for publication the following:

  • “Does Knowledge Secure Warrant to Assert?” Philosophical Studies
  • “Two Claims about Epistemic Propriety,” Synthese
  • “Omniprescience and Tough Choices,” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion
  • “Misleading Dispositions and the Value of Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophical Research
  • “How (Not) to Attack the Luck Argument,” Philosophical Explorations
  • “Hiddenness, Evidence, and Idolatry” (with Jeff Cervantez), in Evidence and Religious Belief, eds. Raymond VanArragon and Kelly James Clark, Oxford: Oxford University Press
  • “The Fall of the Mind Argument and Some Lessons about Freedom” (with Donald Smith), in Action, Ethics and Responsibility, eds. Joseph Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
  • “Contextualism and Interest-Relative Invariantism,” Continuum Companion to Epistemology, ed. Andrew Cullison

Coffman, whose published work is increasingly being cited by other philosophers, was also awarded the White Undergraduate Teaching Award in 2009. The award rotates between several departments in the College of Arts and Sciences.

Selected Publications

“Does Luck Exclude Control?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2009): 499-504.

“Warrant without Truth?” Synthese 162 (2008): 173-194.

“Thinking about Luck,” Synthese 158 (2007): 385-398.

“Alfred Mele’s Metaphysical Freedom?” (with Ted Warfield), Philosophical Explorations 10 (2007): 185-194.

“Three Arguments against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support” (with Daniel Howard-Snyder), Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2006): 535-564.

“Defending Klein on Closure and Skepticism,” Synthese 151 (2006): 257-272.

Visit the Quest Gallery at Trace, UT’s digital archive, to access publications of other Quest Scholars of the Week.

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